The case of R v G may have consigned "objective" Caldwell recklessness to the history books, but this article argues that the development of two species of recklessness was necessitated through the law having to deal with risk-taking in two separate contexts: those of result crime and conduct crime. The mistake was for the law to try to apply a common meaning of recklessness (either subjective or objective) in both contexts. Instead, the law should have taken account of the different psychological processes involved, which entail that distinct forms of mens rea should be applied in each context.
DRAFT APRIL 2010
S Cunningham 4 twentieth century it would appear that recklessness was developing as a doctrine of mens rea both as an interpretation of "malice" and as a substitute for "negligence".
1. "Recklessness" defined in terms of "negligence"
"Reckless" was first used in the determination of blameworthiness in criminal cases as an epithet in relation to the degree of negligence required to find a defendant guilty of manslaughter. During the nineteenth century Smith notes that there was an absence of uniformity in judicial directions on the nature and quality of negligence required for conviction for manslaughter. 10 Negligence simpliciter was clearly not enough to warrant conviction for such a serious offence as manslaughter, but the difficulty was in determining how bad the negligence must be before conviction was warranted.
A related issue was the question of whether an objective test ought to apply, requiring D to live up to a particular standard, or whether D could avoid liability as long as he did his incompetent best. 11 This can be seen in the case of Williamson, 12 where an untrained "manmidwife" who attempted to assist the deceased to give birth escaped liability for her death because there was no evidence of inattention on his part. To put it crudely, he had merely bitten off more than he could chew. Smith notes that by the 1830's the wisdom of taking such an approach started to come into question, and a more objective test requiring D to display a certain degree of skill before engaging in dangerous operations started to be introduced.
DRAFT APRIL 2010 S Cunningham 5
Once it became established that those who engaged in medical practices were required to be skilled in such procedures, the question remained as to how bad the defendant's conduct must be before he would be convicted of manslaughter. Some cases merely suggested that the degree of negligence needed was something above the level of that required for civil liability, 14 whilst others tried to express the degree of negligence required as an adjective. It is in this context that "recklessly" was used in the case of Elliott.
15
The first occasion on which the word "reckless" or "recklessly" was attached to the definition of a statutory offence within English law was in the Motor Car Act 1903, 16 s.1(1) of which read:
If any person drives a motor car on a public highway recklessly or negligently, or at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition and use of the highway, and to the amount of traffic which actually is at the time, or which might reasonably be expected to be, on the highway, that person shall be guilty of an offence under this Act.
This section actually introduced four offences, one of which was reckless driving.
17
Prior to the enactment of this offence, drivers of motor vehicles could be prosecuted for Thomas [1921] 1 KB 632. The other three offences were driving negligently, driving at a speed which is dangerous to the public and driving in a manner which is dangerous to the public.
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18
Due to the greater speeds which could be achieved by a motor car, it was seen to be necessary to introduce a separate law for such vehicles. In passing this new law there was some discussion in the House of Lords as to whether the words "without due care" should be used instead of "negligently", 19 but it would appear that little consideration was given to the suitability of the word "recklessly" in this context, which was adopted with limited discussion.
20 18 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s.35 -"Whosoever having the charge of any carriage or vehicle, shall, by wanton and furious driving or racing, or other wilful misconduct, or by wilful neglect, do or cause to be done any bodily harm to any person whatsoever, shall be guilty of an offence." Note that this requires that bodily harm is caused. The Highway Act 1835, s.78 included offences of causing hurt or damage to any person by negligence or wilful misbehaviour, negligently or wilfully being at such a distance from a carriage so as not to have direction and government of the horses and driving furiously so as to endanger life or limb. Another offence of "wanton and furious" driving, and other offences, applies specifically to the driver of Hackney carriages under London Hackney Carriages Act 1843, s.28.
19 Hansard, 24 July 1903, vol 25, col 213. 20 One MP in the House of Commons was of the opinion that the use of this word, rather than the one already in use of "furiously", did nothing to change the substance of the law, and argued that the new law merely placed the motor car driver in the same position as the "ordinary" driver: Mr Cripps, MP What appears surprising is that the legislature in 1930 decided to discard the term "negligently" from the statutory offence and preserve "recklessly", given that gross negligence was the mens rea term in use to establish liability for manslaughter in cases of fatal traffic collisions. However, as noted above, there was no agreement as to whether "gross" was the best adjective to use in describing the degree of negligence required for manslaughter, and "recklessly negligent" had been used in the case of Elliott. The explanation for the legislature's disposal of the term "negligently" in the Road Traffic Act 1930 can probably be attributed to the development of case law, since by then "recklessly"
outside it on the highway. The section was not meant for the protection of persons on the car itself… I do not think that the intention was to punish anyone who was reckless as regards passengers on the car". A parent reckless about the state of his child's health, not caring whether or not he is at risk, cannot be heard to say that he never gave the matter a thought and was therefore not wilful in not calling in a doctor. In such circumstances recklessness constitutes mens rea no less than positive awareness of the risk involved in failure to act.
38
Elsewhere in statute, the term "reckless" has been used as a substitute for "negligence" in relation to the offence of making a misleading forecast under s.12(1) of the defendants with driving "at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public" and not with driving "recklessly". 40 In coming to that conclusion he drew on the "ordinary meaning" of the word "reckless" in the English language as: "'careless', 'heedless', 'inattentive to duty'. Literally, of course, it means 'without reck'. 'Reck' is simply an old English word, now, perhaps, obsolete, meaning 'heed', 'concern', or 'care'". 41 Donovan J. was clearly of the opinion that reckless in this context meant gross negligence, although he chose to express this in terms of the defendant displaying a "high degree" of negligence.
"Recklessness" as an interpretation of "malice"
Over time it seems that "reckless" became used as an interpretation of "malice" which had been a mens rea requirement of several statutory offences. was "increasingly assuming a meaning of conscious risk taking". 47 The judges using the term seem not to have considered the need for a clear definition of it; such definition did not appear until the beginning of the twentieth century and has been accredited to Professor
Kenny. Kenny's definition of malice, which originally appeared in 1902 but continued to be referred to in later editions of his book edited by Turner, was that:
In any statutory definition of a crime, malice must be taken not in the old vague sense of wickedness in general but as requiring either (1) An actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done; or (2) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (i.e., the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done and yet has gone on to take the risk of it).
48 44 (1874) 2 C.C.R. 119. Here the offence alleged was one of unlawfully and maliciously breaking a window under s.51 of the 1861 Act. Smith notes that Blackburn J seems to have used "reckless" in the subjective sense in that he said that D's act would be malicious if D knew the natural consequences of his act would be to break the glass, although that was not his wish, and he was reckless whether he did it or not. However, Lord Coleridge CJ in the same judgment combined his use of the word "reckless" with "reasonably", seemingly mixing subjective and objective fault elements. Smith, above n.9, p.164.
45 (1875) non-fatal offences against the person and offences punishing damage to property. In relation to the latter offence it was thought necessary to modernise the law and so the Criminal Damage Act 1971 amended the statutory requirement of "malicious" criminal damage to a requirement of "recklessness".
The two paths collide: Caldwell and Lawrence
The fact that recklessness was used to interpret the meaning of malice in case law explains why, when the legislature came to modernise the law of criminal damage, it chose to replace the statutory requirement of "malicious" criminal damage with a requirement of 
III A key distinction: result crimes and conduct crimes
The law has developed in the past century in such a way as to ground itself in a dichotomy of subjective versus objective recklessness. In relation to reckless driving, however, if the relevant statutes proscribing bad driving had stuck with the term "negligent"
or "dangerous" and not, without proper consideration, employed the term "reckless", it may be that this dichotomy would never have taken hold. When the definition of "recklessness" in relation to reckless driving was eventually tackled by the courts it was necessary to consider how a driver's state of mind could be described as "reckless", informed by an understanding of the term derived from its use as a substitute for maliciousness, involving advertence to the This distinction was recognised by some of those participating in the cases discussed earlier. In Murphy the distinction was made between "reckless" as an adjective describing an attitude towards certain possible consequences (result crime), and "recklessly" as an adverb governing the accused's conduct (conduct crime). In each case the word "reckless" or "recklessly" is doing a different job, and so it makes sense that it should carry a different meaning. In one, "recklessness" is describing a state of mind, whilst in the other it relates to the quality of D's act.
A similar argument was made in Lawrence. Counsel for the Crown contended that there are three basic categories of recklessness:
79 From this point onwards the term "non-aggravated criminal damage" will be used to differentiate the offence should go about it in such a way that it does not risk bringing about a more serious harm: that of causing death. Thus, given that the offence under s.1(2) can be seen in this way to be a conduct crime, rather than a result crime, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that a different meaning should be attributed to "reckless" in this context. In this case the particular conduct is unlawful, but in essence D is being punished more harshly because of the way D goes about it and the more harmful risk that is created.
Under this analysis, criminal damage under s.1(2) would require two interpretations of "being reckless": subjective recklessness in relation to the result element of the offence (causing damage) and objective recklessness in relation to the conduct element of the offence DRAFT APRIL 2010 S Cunningham 24 (endangering others). In terms of statutory interpretation it could be argued that the parliamentary drafters could not have meant for these different meanings to be attributed to "being reckless" within the different subsections, and that had they wished for the alternative meanings to apply they would have utilised different terminology. However, the argument here is not that "reckless" or "recklessly" appearing in statute should be interpreted to mean different things, but that we need to look at the underlying nature of the offence to determine if it is D's conduct that D is being punished for, or whether it is his state of mind in relation to a proscribe harm that has resulted. Where a conduct crime has utilised the term "reckless" within its definition, this would suggest that it ought not to be interpreted as requiring subjective Cunningham recklessness and that the offence may need redrafting.
An example of this is the offence of rape. Rape is a conduct crime, since it penalises those who engage in sexual intercourse without the consent of their partner, without requiring any particular result from the act. When a man wishes to have sexual intercourse with another person, it is incumbent on him to take care that his partner is consenting, and to address his mind to that matter, before engaging in the act. 83 It is appropriate, therefore, that an objective form of mens rea be required for rape. Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 defined the mens rea of the offence as being that D knew that the person does not consent to the intercourse or is reckless as to whether that person consents to it. This led to difficulties of interpretation in cases such as Pigg, 84 where Caldwell recklessness was applied to the 83 Herring and Madden Dempsey have argued that sexual penetration is in itself a prima facie wrong requiring justification: Madden Dempsey and Herring, "Why Sexual Penetration Requires Justification" (2007) 27 O.J.L.S. 467-491. It is not suggested here that one need go so far as accepting such a proposition in order to agree that those who choose to engage in sex must do so with care. Now that reckless driving has been replaced by dangerous driving the problem of ensuring that culpability in driving offences concentrates on the manner in which the activity of driving is carried out, rather than on the state of mind of the driver at the time of the creation of a risk, has been resolved. There remain, however, a few offences in relation to which it is not clear whether subjective recklessness or some other form of mens rea applies.
Following the above discussion, it is submitted that in deliberating this question, a specific definition of recklessness should apply to result crimes such as offences against the person and non-aggravated criminal damage, whilst in relation to conduct crimes a different, more objective test is appropriate.
91 [1980] Crim LR 309 at p.312.
92 (1983) It is submitted that the court's decision is erroneous and that, contrary to what was suggested in this case, R v G has no effect on either the offence of child neglect or the offence of misconduct in public office and that as these offences are conduct crimes seeking to punish those who fail to live up to a standard of care incumbent upon them, a different test to that applicable to result crimes ought to be applied.
The way in which blameworthiness should be attributed in relation to result crimes, on the one hand, and conduct crimes, on the other, reflects the distinction between the capacity conception and the normative conception of mens rea. 98 Cognitive mens rea requires either intention to cause a result or foresight of that result, whilst normative mens rea involves ensuring that the "mens was rea". 99 Under the normative conception, the defendant's actions must be evaluated, taking into account all the circumstances and not only what was going on in the defendant's mind. Whilst some might argue that the normative and cognitive conceptions of mens rea are incompatible with one another, the argument here is 97 The court's ruling on this point is rather perplexing. The mens rea of the offence is stated as follows: "There must be an awareness of the duty to act or a subjective recklessness as to the existence of the duty. The recklessness test will apply to the question whether in particular circumstances a duty arises at all as well as to the conduct of the defendant if it does. The subjective test applies both to reckless indifference to the legality of the act or omission and in relation to the consequences of the act or omission" (at [30] ). Given that this is a conduct crime and no consequences are required in order that the offence be proved this last sentence appears nonsensical. The causing death by driving offences are not the only homicide offences which do not sit well with the foregoing thesis that one form of recklessness applies to result crimes and a different form of mens rea, probably best described as gross negligence, applies to conduct crimes. Involuntary manslaughter is a result crime, the mens rea for which can be 103 Although it may be argued that the test under s.2A(3) should be limited to the creation of a danger of injury to people and not extend to the risk of serious damage to property.
